

INTRODUCTION

European Monarchs and Colonialism, Past and Present

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From the sixteenth century onwards, a substantial number of European states engaged in overseas colonialism and, later, imperialism.¹ For many of them, their colonies were to become of crucial importance in terms of economics, geopolitics, and status. Most of these states were monarchies. Yet apart from early studies such as John Mackenzie's *Propaganda and Empire* and David Cannadine's *Ornamentalism* or, more recently, three pioneering and fascinating edited volumes published by Robert Aldrich and Cindy McCreery, the extant historiography pays scant attention to the dynamics between monarchs and colonialism — and this includes the venerable journals *The Court Historian* and *The Royal Studies Journal*. Moreover, these studies tend to focus primarily on the British Empire and on the symbolic role of monarchy in colonialism, rather than on issues such as motivations, attitudes, power, and profits.² Perhaps most scholars have found it all too obvious that monarchs were implicated in European colonialism. But there is far more to say on this topic and to explore, as we collectively attempt to demonstrate in this book.

This book emerged as a spin-off from an extensive research project on the role of the House of Orange-Nassau in the colonial history of the Netherlands. The questions raised in that project and the evidence uncovered prompted new questions about the role of monarchs in other colonial empires. We therefore decided to invite historians specializing in the colonial history of other European states for a seminar dedicated to this theme; the papers presented there formed the basis for the present volume. *European Monarchs & Colonialism* has indeed helped the researchers in the Dutch project to sharpen our questions and analyses. More important for the general reader, this volume offers a first comparative discussion of the linkages between ten European monarchies

and colonialism, seeking to identify connections and parallels, as well as contrasts, from early modernity to present-day public debates.

In this short introduction, we first offer some general observations regarding linkages between European state formation, monarchy, and colonialism. Next, we introduce and interrogate our selection of monarchical states. We then summarize the main findings of this explorative volume, following the topics we asked the authors to pursue: attitudes, influence, and power; money matters; courtly prestige; soft power; and contemporary reckonings. We should point out that with the partial exception of the theme of soft power, these questions are very much about metropolitan colonialism rather than about the consequences for the colonies and their inhabitants. In that sense, this endeavour glosses over the arguably most important question about colonial and postcolonial history, i.e. the impact of colonialism, then and now. Inevitably in a first attempt at systematic comparison, not all themes could be covered evenly by all authors. We nevertheless hope our readers will not only appreciate the evidence and interpretations offered, but will also be inspired to start filling in the many lacunae in the present state of the art on this broad and fascinating theme.

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COLONIALISM, EUROPEAN STATE FORMATION AND THE ROLE OF MONARCHS

With the exception of the Dutch case, all of the European states under discussion here embarked on colonialism as monarchies (Table 1). Over the centuries, some of these European states put an end to monarchy and became republics, while the remaining monarchs were increasingly brought under constitutional and eventually democratic control.

What role did monarchs play in the interrelated processes of state formation and colonial expansion? Around 1500, few would have expected that Europe would come to dominate the far reaches of the globe in the centuries that followed. By the time Columbus sailed with three small ships across the Atlantic, Portugal and a collection of Spanish kingdoms had already managed to push Muslim rulers out of Iberia. On the fringes of the bustling Mediterranean and the struggling European continent, Portugal would lead the way in the development of overseas colonialism by sending out explorers and lower nobles who conquered occasional islands and undertook trade, diplomacy, and proselytization. Still, at that point in time, Europe played a modest global role. On the

other side of the Mediterranean, the symbolic fall of Constantinople and the onward push of the Ottomans into Europe may have given the impression of a continent composed of weak monarchical assemblies. The European monarchies were certainly small and insignificant compared with Mughal India, Safavid Persia, or Ming China.³

All over the continent in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European monarchs were involved in a staggering number of violent conflicts. These could be wars against other kings, but also with domestic rivals, often relatives, who claimed their throne. As Charles Tilly has demonstrated, there were several different trajectories of European state formation, but war played a central role in all of them: 'War made the state, and the state made war'.⁴ Most often, we find monarchical dynasties at the head of these warring states. These families tied their fate to the success of the state, some over many generations, others only for shorter periods, as is illustrated by the long list of monarchical houses replacing one another in virtually all European colonial states (Table 1).

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In the context of the rapid rise of Islam and the Protestant challenge to Catholic hegemony, kings increasingly came to play a religious role on behalf of the state. This gave their military and expansionist undertakings a deeper religious meaning. Early colonialists therefore carried the symbols of both the church and the king on their overseas adventures. But of course, the pursuit of economic and geopolitical gains was crucial. The early Spanish and Portuguese conquests in Asia and the Atlantic world became an important point of reference for rivals across Europe, even if the monarchies had different roles in this process. The flow of silver from the mines of Peru filled France, Britain, and others with envy. By emulating and plundering the Iberians, the kingdoms of North-Western Europe began to build their empires. The result was a growing number of parallel colonial empires, with trading posts in Asia, West Africa, and the Americas as well as areas where large-scale mining and plantation agriculture became increasingly important, and with it the exploitation of Indigenous labour in all sorts of semi-bonded arrangements, as well as the increased use of enslaved Africans and Asians shipped across the seas.

The ability to make war in Europe but also at the new overseas frontiers was dependent on the ability to raise considerable armies made up of European and, particularly, Indigenous recruits.⁵ The rise of long-distance traders and financial elites was crucial to the finances of the early modern European states. By the early seventeenth century, encouraging colonialism, securing access to trade routes, and supporting the merchant

classes had become an important objective for many European states, and hence for their kings, including in relatively small and peripheral states such as Denmark or Sweden. Once they had appropriated overseas territories from Indigenous peoples, these aspiring colonial powers became increasingly obsessed with closing off their newly acquired possessions to outsiders. Under the broad concept of mercantilism, we find a host of policies aimed at preventing trade deficits and making profit from continental trade and later from colonial possessions, both as sources of tropical products and as markets for European goods.⁶ The granting of exclusive licences and the founding of monopolistic companies became the hallmark of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century colonialism. In most cases, there was some sort of royal involvement with these colonial companies. These companies were often given state-like prerogatives, including with respect to warfare and governance.⁷ As for trade, the Atlantic companies were instrumental in transporting many millions of enslaved Africans to the Americas. Slave-trading was also part and parcel of the work of Europe's Asian companies, in particular the Dutch East India Company.

Even in the early modern period, European monarchs were seldom all powerful in political affairs. The time of absolutist monarchies in Europe was relatively short, if ever more than mythical. The French 'Sun King' Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) and the Russian Romanovs may have come close, but even their power was circumscribed. In most European states, kings did not come near to exerting absolute powers, but rather played roles as mediators between different factional interests and aristocratic and high bourgeois families in their domains. While they may have strived for absolute power, reality was different, as they knew well. And this also applied to their prerogatives and actual power in colonial policies.

Decolonization started with the American Revolution (1765/1773-83), but the British Empire survived and would expand dramatically over the long nineteenth century, establishing maritime dominance across the world, including a new phase of conquest and imperial expansion. The Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815) shook the entire European state system and the colonial empires to their core. France had to give up Saint-Domingue, its most highly prized colony in the Caribbean. Spain lost most of its American colonies over the following decades and Brazil severed its ties with Portugal, even if scions from the House of Bragança acted as emperors in the former colony until 1889. Great Britain took over several Dutch colonies, but the Netherlands regained

its status as a colonial power. Denmark and Sweden continued as minor colonial powers.

Over the next century, the restored monarchies — or, in the case of the Netherlands and later Belgium, Italy, and Germany, newly established kingdoms aspiring to own colonies to confirm their status⁸ — became more firmly embedded constitutionally in the states they nominally headed. New, more bureaucratic states established ministries for colonial affairs, aiming at more efficiency and control. Parliamentary control limited monarchical power from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards, at a time when the zenith of European imperialism was yet to come. China, other parts of Asia, and most of Africa came under European control fairly late in colonial history. This implied yet another round of violence, racism, and exploitation.

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By then, monarchs had by and large become peripheral to the political process, although the colonies on occasion provided a stage for their involvement and initiative. In most cases, their importance was primarily symbolic. States had become nation states, and nation-building became one of the challenges for modern states. In monarchies, kings and queens were given a crucial role as the embodiment of their nation. The degree to which this embodiment was given an explicit imperial dimension varied, but most monarchs probably did enjoy this extension of their ceremonial status, which lasted until and perhaps beyond the eventual dismantlement of the various colonial empires.

SELECTION OF STATES

This book offers case studies on, in alphabetical order, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This begs the question why these states were selected and not others, both in Europe and beyond. A solid case can indeed be made to broaden the canvas, and many of our questions might also be relevant for former colonial monarchies worldwide. We made our choices for a mixture of conceptual and pragmatic reasons. Empires have been fundamental in world history as we know it, and at the apex of most empires were dynasties.⁹ There are good reasons though to differentiate between the predominantly land-based empires which were based on the conquest and taxation of adjacent agricultural societies, and the overseas colonialism that emerged in Europe from the late fifteenth century. These colonial ventures developed into fully-fledged imperialism over the

subsequent centuries and came to an end in the late twentieth century after several waves of decolonization. Some defining characteristics of this European colonialism set it apart from earlier empire-building: its connection to modern state formation; its capitalist character; its global dimension; the (ethnocentric and often racist) legitimization of the pursuit of economic and geopolitical self-interest that clearly distinguished between what was permissible and appropriate in the home country and in the overseas territories; and its lasting impact up to the present.

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But of course European expansion to other continents was not limited to the maritime empires. Certainly, there would be good reasons to include two land-based European empires, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian ones.¹⁰ Both expanded over time, were multi-ethnic, exploited different types of bonded labour, and were ruled by a monarch residing in the capital at the heart of the empire. Neither, however, participated in the early modern Atlantic and Asian expansion, including the trans-Atlantic slave trade, or the late-nineteenth-century scramble for Africa. We also considered including the Ottoman Empire, which was headed by sultans and expanded into Africa, Europe, and Asia. Surely it may be argued that its history was colonial, and even if most of its expansion was over land, there were maritime exploits as well. In addition, of course, the Ottoman empire has a long history of slavery. But again, this empire did not participate in the overseas colonialism of the rivalling European states that we centre on here.

Another candidate to include would be Japan, if we had not decided to focus exclusively on the colonial monarchies of Europe. Japanese colonialism started late, but did share many characteristics with contemporary European colonialism — as did the United States' projection of power in the same period, but of course there is no link to monarchy there. Japanese colonialism commenced in the late nineteenth century with the conquest of islands in the Pacific, accelerated with military and governmental expansion into Korea from 1910 onwards and in China in the 1930s. During World War Two, Japan occupied the British, French, and Dutch colonies in South-East Asia. In the end, the Japanese wartime slogan of 'Asia for the Asians' was a poor excuse for substituting its own exploitative colonialism for the previous European variants. The emperors' political power surpassed that of contemporary European monarchs in every way, and they were directly involved and hence responsible for Japanese colonialism and warfare — but as Carol Gluck observed long ago, this role was wilfully ignored, thus remaining a 'ghost at the historical feast'.¹¹

European Monarchs & Colonialism is not about European colonialism as such, but focuses on the role of monarchs, and hence royal dynasties, in this history. Monarchs were heads of state and acted as such to further state interests, but were at the same time driven by personal and dynastic motives. It is not easy, perhaps even impossible, to differentiate between statist and dynastic objectives. This question is raised in several of the contributions to this book. Bearing this caveat in mind, we asked the contributors to this volume to address five broad questions. As indicated above, not all authors in this volume were able to address all questions in depth, which underlines the pioneering character of our collaborative project. Much work remains to be done.

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The first question relates to monarchical attitudes and power: *What position did monarchs take in the great changes in colonial policy: early initiatives (including licensing, founding companies, and expeditions), the abolition of slavery, the rise of imperialism, and decolonization? Was their support sought for this? And if so, did they play a vital role?* Of course, the answers provided vary, but it is clearly possible to provide some generalizations.

First and foremost, without exception, all authors in this volume emphasize that across time and place, monarchs supported colonialism in its early stages, including slavery — and none were actively or decisively supportive of abolitionism in their own colonies. The importance of their contributions during the early modern period varied, depending first of all on how strong their hold was on politics in general. Catia Antunes, Laurent Dubois, and Brooke Newman, respectively, indicate the deep and direct involvement of the Portuguese, French, and English kings in colonial affairs throughout the early modern period. Regina Grafe emphasizes that Spanish colonialism was also supported by the monarchy, but in practice executed by individual entrepreneurs. Thomas Lindblad, for Sweden, and Michael Bregnsbo, for Denmark, likewise inform us of the limited nature of actual monarchical influence on colonial affairs. Perhaps this is merely a matter of degree — in sum, all *ancien régime* monarchies supported colonialism, but everywhere, individual civil servants, colonial companies, and entrepreneurs were given or usurped power and made deals. Only the Dutch case is really exceptional in this respect as there was no monarch and the stadtholders, as mere ‘servants’ of the States-General of the Dutch Republic, were only allowed an indirect and, as Gert Oostindie indicates, most often rather marginal role.

After the Napoleonic wars, France oscillated between a republic and a monarchy several times until 1870, with the establishment of the Third Republic. Portugal became a republic in 1910. In both cases, the monarchy had long ceased to have a significant influence in colonial affairs. But meanwhile three newly established monarchies emerged, each of which had royals keen to support imperial endeavours. Giuseppe Finaldi demonstrates how the Savoy monarchy played this role in Italy, as Matthew Fitzpatrick does for Germany, in particular Kaiser Wilhelm II. But as Idesbald Goddeeris makes clear, no European monarch was as decisive as the Belgian King Leopold II, infamous for his ruthless exploitation of the Congo. The contrast with the older colonial monarchies (Spain, the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden) and with the Netherlands is evident. As the power of kings and queens in these states was increasingly hemmed in, their political role in colonial affairs shifted to a merely symbolic one.

Colonialism implied violence throughout the centuries; there is little evidence of kings and queens worrying about the brutal suppression of revolts or all-out colonial wars. Monarchs retained their colonial mindset until the end; not one king or queen anywhere in Europe was known for even silently sympathizing with the struggle for independence in the colonies until well after the Second World War. These statements may seem somewhat apodictic, but a close reading of each of the ten case studies does not really suggest a more nuanced conclusion.

Why were monarchs so interested in colonialism? Again, the evidence for all of these ten colonial monarchies points in the same direction. All monarchs were driven by economic and geopolitical expectations, as were their aristocrat and merchant compatriots. The early Iberian monarchies were probably exceptional in adding religious zeal to these drivers. In a much later stage, the remaining European kings and queens wholeheartedly supported the partial turn to civilizing missions, as in the British ‘white man’s burden’ and the Dutch ethical policy. This certainly did not replace previous self-serving motives, but did at least demonstrate a sense of responsibility.

MONEY MATTERS

The next question we submitted to the contributors centred on the financial dimension: *How did the monarchy contribute financially to colonialism? Was this personal, familial, or a matter of state — if such distinction*

can be made at all? And specifically, is there evidence of substantial colonial income adding to the fortune of the monarchs?

One of the reasons monarchs supported colonialism was because they hoped for economic benefits, for their states as well as for their personal coffers. And most of them were willing to act as entrepreneurs to give colonial endeavours a boost. In the early modern period, they supported expeditions, the founding of colonial companies and the like, not only through their policies, but equally by investing their own money. Beyond this generalization, however, things are more complicated. Certainly for the early modern period, it is extremely difficult and perhaps conceptually not even useful to differentiate between financial flows generated by a state, a specific monarch, or a royal house in general — both for expenditures, investment, and income. Things do not become much more transparent in later centuries, when the surviving monarchies became increasingly dependent on state income while retaining older sources of wealth and making new investments.

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Directly and indirectly, colonial income must have added to the wealth of royal families. But how important this was, and how these colonial proceeds compared to other sources of income is impossible to say at this stage. The extant historiography does not allow for hard conclusions for the individual monarchies, much less for a systematic comparison spanning many centuries, with the exception of the Dutch case.

COURTLY PRESTIGE

In our third set of questions, we shifted the focus to the impact of colonialism on the royal courts, assuming that royals sought other rewards beyond mere money: *How did colonialism contribute to the status, prestige, and clientelist position of the monarchs? Was the colonial world referenced and included in court culture, court architecture, and collections? We may think of the presence of servants from the colonies, paintings of colonial possessions on display in the palaces, or (possibly looted) objects in (scientific) collections.*

Most of the authors think that these dimensions were indeed part and parcel of the royal involvement with colonialism, but do not discuss this subject at length. The question of how royals benefitted from colonialism through clientelism is not easily answered. There is quite some evidence for many states demonstrating how monarchs used the distribution of attractive positions in the colonies or colonial

offices in the metropolis to prop up their status as a patron expecting their dues, but we are a long way from moving from anecdotes to firm evidence.

18 | There is far more evidence documenting how the colonies were represented at royal courts. One way to do so was by building collections of tropical nature, maps, the arts, and ethnographic objects. Another way was to ensure the presence at royal courts of people from the colonies, whether they be enslaved people and servants, respected artists, or scions of colonial aristocracies. Through such mechanisms, royal houses emphasized the colonial dimension of their rule, making them more cosmopolitan and hence prestigious. Perhaps they hoped this would help raise their rank in the informal hierarchy of European dynasties; whether this was really the case remains an open question at this stage.

Losing colonies was not a welcome prospect for any monarch. In the early modern period, colonies were lost mainly as a result of intra-European wars. From the Age of Revolutions and up to the 1970s, anticolonial struggles made the difference. As a rule, monarchs opposed giving up colonies as this would diminish the economic and geopolitical interests of the states they were nominally heading. But it is perfectly possible that monarchs also experienced the shrinking of empire as harmful to their dynastic prestige. Perhaps this helps explain the apparent enthusiasm of post-Second-World-War royals for touring former colonies, where they were usually welcomed with respect rather than resentment — as if colonialism had been a mutually benefitting arrangement overseen by benign kings and queens.

SOFT POWER

Vila Real, San Fernando, Port Louis, Jamestown, Willemstad, Christiansted, Carolusburg, Gustavia, Wilhelmshaven, Umberto I, Léopoldville... From the early sixteenth through to the twentieth century, new places all over the colonial world were named after European royals. It may be argued that for centuries, such symbolic appropriations spoke to European colonists rather than to the subjugated peoples. But since the later nineteenth century, politicians and colonial officers of the emerging constitutional monarchies developed new ways of utilizing royals as soft power — with mutual consent. Hence our fourth question: *What roles were allocated to the Crown, in the context of the nineteenth-century*

formation of European nation states, in creating the idea of an imperial unity and harmony, and in this context, how were relations with aristocracies and royal families in the colonies (re)framed?

While from the late nineteenth century onwards, European monarchies traded in their earlier pan-European character to focus on more narrowly defined symbols of nation-building, paradoxically this involved a widening of the imagined nation to include the colonial realm. Examples abound, particularly for the British and Dutch cases. In their Caribbean colonies, the ending of slavery was presented as a gift from the king, even if neither monarchy had ever opposed slavery or had sided explicitly with the abolitionists. Over the next century, technological developments provided new ways of reaching out to the colonized peoples, first through the print media, subsequently with photography and film, and finally also through royal visits. Colonial bureaucracies made sure that the births of princes and princesses, royal engagements and weddings, coronations and inaugurations were abundantly celebrated in the colonies, just as royal deaths were solemnly mourned. Royal visits, extremely rare during most of the colonial period, became more common in the twentieth century and were equally orchestrated as demonstrations of imperial glory and unity. For all we know, the visiting royals may have worried about whatever could go wrong, but on the face of it they thoroughly enjoyed the staged enthusiasm wherever they were welcomed.¹²

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This dimension of the nexus between monarchy and colonialism is discussed here particularly for the Portuguese, British, Dutch, Danish, and Belgian cases. We may well assume that future research will add to our understanding how this attempt to build some sort of imagined imperial community, to paraphrase Benedict Anderson, materialized in other empires.¹³ Much remains to be explored on this nexus. Thus, while one might assume that soft power had more purchase in settler colonies than in extraction colonies, the first to break away from empire were the thirteen North American colonies, surely settler colonies. And we should not overestimate the impact of these soft power policies in extraction colonies either. In the end, anticolonial struggles were not held back by reverence for far-away kings and queens — often quite the contrary. The whole idea of an imperial community symbolized by the Crown mainly appealed to minorities in the colonies — only for them to discover later that in revolutionary and postcolonial times their loyalty was a source of suspicion, and worse.

Over the past decades, formerly colonial powers in Europe have become embroiled in often heated debates about the colonial past, debates in which the injustices of violence and racism have been severely criticized. In contemporary European republics, monarchical complicity in colonialism is past history, while in the remaining constitutional monarchies there are continuities and questions about accountability for the past. So far, the issue of monarchical complicity and accountability has hardly been addressed in comparative studies on contemporary remembrance of colonialism in Europe.¹⁴ We therefore invited our contributors to reflect on a final question: *Does the monarchy or the history of the monarchy, past and/or present, play a role in contemporary debates about colonialism and its legacies?*

Before we discuss the evidence, it is useful to briefly summarize the extent to which the monarchy matters today in these ten European countries, and to reflect on the lifelines of royal households in the remaining monarchies. Firstly, four of the ten states are no longer monarchies, namely France, Germany, Italy, and Portugal. Whatever debates there may be in these countries about colonialism and its legacies, the role of the monarchy is not a widely discussed topic and there has been no involvement of descendants of former royal families.

This leaves us with six monarchies, at the moment all headed by males, kings. All of the present royal houses have a history that links their own families directly to colonialism, and in the cases of Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden also to slavery (Table 1). The current Spanish king, Felipe VI, is of the House of Bourbon; there have been episodes with other royal houses and republican periods, but after the first two centuries under the Habsburgs, the Bourbons represented the monarchy. The Dutch case stands out as the House of Orange-Nassau has been the sole 'royal' family in national history ever since the sixteenth century, even if the role as stadtholder during the republican period was of course not monarchical; King Willem-Alexander therefore stands in a history dating back to the beginnings of the Dutch state and Dutch colonialism. The same goes for King Philippe of Belgium; but his dynasty's rule only began in 1830 and Belgian colonialism only in the 1880s. In contrast, Kings Charles III of the United Kingdom, Frederik of Denmark, and Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden hail from families that became royal only well into their country's colonial era, in the case of Charles and Frederik even after the ending of slavery.

This may matter for the personal sense of responsibility each of these royals may or may not feel about the colonial past, but of course constitutionally this is irrelevant. As formal heads of states, these six Kings all represent their nations with their particular histories, including colonialism and slavery. Presidents of former monarchies may speak about their republics' responsibility for early modern colonialism and slavery without worrying about their own family's historical involvement. Monarchs cannot escape the latter question. So the issue is whether or not these six Kings are personally inclined to make critical statements about the colonial past and the involvement of their royal predecessors, and whether their governments are actually willing to let them speak out at all.

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The record is mixed. Frederik has not made any critical statements about Danish involvement, nor Carl Gustaf about Swedish colonialism or slavery. It seems that in both cases there has been neither the societal pressure nor political space to do so, perhaps with the exception of the question of whether Denmark thinks of Greenland as a colony and has treated Greenland as such — a hot issue today. Felipe has hardly responded to Spanish American calls to apologize for Spanish colonialism, and apparently his government is not trying to change this. Philippe has a mixed record, first refusing to offer apologies for Belgian colonialism in Congo, next offering apologies, but then secretly interfering in a parliamentary inquiry aimed at an official apology. Charles has expressed regrets about Britain's role in the Atlantic slave trade and Caribbean slavery as well as the violent repression of the Mau Mau revolt in Kenya in the 1950s, but has not apologized or spoken about colonialism as such. His governments have not manifested an inclination for further reconciliatory gestures, nor a willingness to let the King speak out about this on behalf of the nation.

The Dutch case is exceptional here. As head of state, Willem-Alexander offered apologies in Indonesia in 2020 for the extreme violence during the War of Independence (1945-49), a war the Dutch government had already officially characterized during his mother Beatrix's reign as having been 'on the wrong side of history'. In 2023, Willem-Alexander also apologized for the Dutch history of slavery. In both cases, of course, his statements were politically backed by the then Dutch government. The King, a historian by training, gave his speech on slavery a personal, dynastic touch by explicitly asking the descendants of enslaved Africans for forgiveness for the failure of his own House of Orange-Nassau to stand up against 'this crime against humanity'. Likewise, among these

six Kings he has been the only one initiating and financing research, first with a provenance study in the royal collections and subsequently with a comprehensive research programme on the role of his House in Dutch colonial history. This explains why the chapter on the Dutch case provides more concrete evidence — simply because a group of researchers has been working on this particular history over the past three years.

European Royal Houses during the Colonial Period

Belgium

Saxe-Coburg (1831-)

Denmark

Oldenburg (1448-1863)

Sleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg
(1863-)

England/Great Britain/United Kingdom

Tudor (1485-1603, England)

Stuart (1603-94, England & Scotland)

Orange-Nassau (1694-1702, England &
Scotland)

Stuart (1702-07, England & Scotland, 1707-
14 Great Britain)

Hanover (1714-1760-1901, Great Britain/UK)

Saxe-Coburg (1901-1917, UK)

Windsor (same House, renamed, 1917-, UK)

France

Bourbon (1589-1792)

[1st Republic]

Bonaparte (1804-14)

Bourbon (1814-15)

Bonaparte (1815)

Bourbon (1815-30)

Orléans (1830-48)

[2nd Republic]

Bonaparte (1852-70)

Germany

[pre-1871 Kingdom of Brandenburg-Prussia]

[Hohenzollern (1701-1871)]

Hohenzollern (1871-1919)

Italy

Savoy (1861-1946)

Netherlands

[Republic, 1581-1795, stadtholders House of
Orange-Nassau]

[French period, 1795-1814]

Orange-Nassau (1814-)

Portugal

Aviz (1385-1580)

Habsburg (1580-1640, see Spain)

Bragança (1640-1910)

Spain

Castilla & Aragon (-1505)

Habsburg (1504-1700)

Bourbon (1700-1808)

Bonaparte (1808-13)

Bourbon (1813-68)

Savoy (1870-73)

[Republic, 1873-1874]

Bourbon (1874-1931)

[Republic, 1931-75]

Bourbon (1975-)

Sweden

Vasa (1523-1654)

Wittelsbach (1654-1720)

Hessen-Kassel (1720-51)

Holstein-Gottorp (1751-1818)

Bernadotte (1818-)

