

Introduction

Exploring the Boundaries Between Art and Life

How to Deal with the Animated Image

Throughout the history of Western art, viewers treated images as if they were living beings, attributing movement, consciousness, the ability to feel emotions, a character or personality, in short, animation to them. Viewers fell in love with statues, talked to a painting or a house, or were so upset by the gaze of a portrait that they decided to put out its eyes.¹ Many accounts survive of classical lovers of sculpture who spent the night with Praxiteles' statue of Venus.² Numerous Grand Tourists considered the Venus de' Medici, a copy after Praxiteles' original, as the most beautiful work of art they had seen in Italy, and described their visit to the Tribuna as the encounter with a real, living person, endowed with a character and a biography.³ There is the case of the portrait of Bianca Capello, the Venetian patrician who eloped with a Florentine banker, and whose portrait was treated by her Venetian lover as if it were Bianca herself, seating it—or her—at the dining table, talking to it, kissing it and taking it—or her—out to visit the Doge.⁴ Diderot observed in his *Salons* how viewers were tempted to sleep with plaster casts of statues, and imagined himself in love with painted and sculpted ladies, or even with the depictions of ruins.⁵ Francesco I d'Este was so struck by the portrait bust Bernini had made of him, that he became both Pygmalion and Narcissus at the same time, in love with his own image and amazed to see his beloved object come to life.⁶ And finally, there are these strange cases of Renaissance *condottieri*, princes or popes who attempted to endow their image with their

life and presence: in the princely theatres of Parma and Sabbioneta, where they set up a dialectic of gazes between the actual prince, present during theatrical performances, and his statue, ever present, even after his death; between his subjects, the actors and the images of the gods.⁷ Even in their tombs they left their image as a message to the gods of heaven and hell that this was their domain, where they ruled, even after their death.

From the beginning of art and the writing of its history, the animated image has been a presence that refuses to be tamed, be it by the theoretical concepts of lifelikeness or liveliness, the rhetorical persuasive strategies of vivid representation or *enargeia*, or the theological concepts of real presence, simulacra and idols, idolatry and iconoclasm. Testifying to its presence in earliest Greek thought, three classical myths present the attraction or fear the animated image inspires long before it became a topic in art theory: that of Pygmalion presents the dream of the sculptor who sees his adored statue come to life; Narcissus adores the reflection of his own face without realising he is adoring a living being, namely himself; and images of Medusa petrify beholders as if they were gazing into her living eyes.⁸

The lives of images became the object of intense, often anxious scrutiny at various moments in Western art history, in three contexts. Classical rhetoric analysed how the experience of art dissolving into life could be created as an instrument of persuasion. The recurring waves of iconoclasm that took place in the early history of Christianity, in the Byzantine Empire and during the Reformation led to ever more refined theological distinctions between the real, living presence of the divinity in its image and false idolatry. In the decades after 1750, treating a work of art as a living being came under attack from two modes of thought, one ethnographical, the other aesthetic, that shared a preoccupation with what William Pietz has called 'our passionate apprehension of sensuously material objects'.⁹ On one side the concept of fetishism was introduced to define non-European religious adoration of inanimate objects in the first ethnographic studies of religion outside Europe. On the other, the new philosophical discipline of aesthetics rejected any adoration of images as the divinities they represented as a misapprehension and worse, as a self-willed loss of rational autonomy versus the artwork.

Greek and Roman rhetoric developed a major body of thought on animated images. Under the heading of *elocutio*, the stage of speech preparation where the orator finds the most persuasive stylistic form for what he

wants to say, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian gave advice on how to write descriptions that are so vivid and lifelike that the audience believes they are seeing what is described, rather than listening to somebody speaking. Such descriptions were to be achieved by the use of figures of speech or thought and by what we would now call narrative techniques, such as detailed description constructed with telling details, the introduction of an eye witness, or a sudden address of the public. If successful, speech appears to dissolve into what it describes. Treatment of these issues occurred in discussions of *enargeia* (vividness) and its Latin equivalents *evidentia* or *illustratio*, and of *energeia* (actuality).¹⁰ These were considered as among the most important, if not the main instruments of persuasion.

Quintilian argued that ‘oratory fails of its full effect [...] if its appeal is merely to the hearing [...] and not displayed in [its] living truth to the eyes of the mind’. The orator should act on the eyes not the ears of the public and should excite vivid images before their mind’s eye. ‘*Enargeia*’, as Quintilian put it, ‘makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence.’ By its very visibility rhetorical discussions of vivid representation also became relevant for the visual arts.¹¹ As we shall see in this book, rhetorical concepts and strategies informed the way orators, artists and viewers tried to negotiate the boundaries between life and art, and the accounts they gave of the animation of images, long after the original definition of these concepts.

The theological tradition of dealing with the animation of images originated in the Mosaic Law against the production and adoration of images of Yahweh. Returning to this Mosaic Law, Christian iconoclasts produced a body of theory about the adoration of divine images based on the Platonic distinction between *eikones*, images of real beings or gods, and *simulacra*, images of idols and false gods. This is an ontological distinction, based on a differentiation between a real and a spurious existence of the being represented; and it is a normative definition, aiming at setting apart the idolaters, who adore the images of false gods, from the true believers. In the Middle Ages, a body of thought about the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist was developed to account for the adoration of an inanimate piece of matter as if it were the living body of the Saviour.¹² Throughout Western history, these ontological and theological or normative modes of thought have determined to a large degree how the lives of images were conceived.

A third body of thought about animated images was developed in the second half of the eighteenth century, combining ethnographic fetish theory and aesthetics.¹³ Their rise occurred at the same time, in the 1750s, as the publication of Charles de Brosses' *Du culte des dieux fétiches* in 1757 and of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* in 1750. De Brosses' book was an essay in the new, enlightened discipline of the historical, critical study of religion; Baumgarten's an attempt to define aesthetic experiences as part of a separate domain of enlightened experience in which the rational mind could exercise its free powers of sensation and reflection, and as such very different from the realm of religious feeling. Immanuel Kant took Baumgarten's position much further. His entire *Critique of Judgment* (1790), a foundational text both for German idealist aesthetics and academic art history, can be read as a solution to the problem fetish worship poses to the enlightened mind. The rational, critical mind is capable of recognising that we tend to attribute the purposiveness or *Zweckmäßigkeit* we can give to artefacts to natural organisms as well, which have not been created by a conscious agent. At the same time it is aware that this is only an attribution or hypothesis without which we are not able to have adequate knowledge of such organisms.¹⁴ Just as we need the hypothesis of purposiveness to understand natural organisms, so too, it may be argued by extension, we need the hypothesis of life to understand images.

Fetish theory and aesthetics are therefore united by their effort to deal with objects, be they objects of non-Western worship or European works of art, that exercise an influence on their beholders that exceeds their objecthood. In the eighteenth century, African cults of fetishes were dismissed as the sign of a primitive mind, because they attributed purpose and intentionality to inanimate objects subjected to the laws of causality—just as viewers do who claim a work of art is alive, looks at them or exercises some other kind of agency. Together with anthropomorphism this became the sign of the superstitious, irrational mind unaware of the laws of physical cause and effect that rule the world. Both the rationalist critique of fetishism by De Brosses and Kant's critique of inherent purposiveness attributed to the products of nature are part of the same enlightened endeavour to make sense of the attribution of life and agency to inanimate objects.

The discussions on the conflicts inherent in attributing life to art also come to the surface in two Italian journeys written by Germans who were very well aware of recent developments in ethnography or aesthetics, and helped shape them. While in Rome in 1787, Johann Wolfgang Goethe

observed how viewers kissed the hand of the statue of the Giustiniani Minerva. The wife of the guardian asked him whether he had a girlfriend that looked like the statue, 'daß er mich so sehr anzöge' ['since the statue attracted me so much']; and despite his disdain for such adoration of a work of art, devoid of 'brüderliche Verehrung eines Menschengestes' ['brotherly admiration for a human spirit'], he confessed that he did not want to leave the statue.¹⁵ That other author of an *Italian Journey*, Johann Gottfried Herder, moved in his unusually frank description of the statue of a Hermaphrodite in the Villa Borghese from an analysis of the way the sculptor had represented this theme to a description of a living, breathing body that aroused him sexually, but did not hide the mixture of fascination and discomfort he felt while gazing at the statue.¹⁶

Around 1800, both the anthropologist Jacques-Antoine Dulaure and the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge would signal that such excessive adoration of inanimate objects, formerly only the domain of ethnography, could also be found among European viewers adoring their works of art. They would present it, prefiguring Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, as a universal tendency to lavish on dead matter the emotions normally reserved for living beings.¹⁷

Rhetorical, religious, anthropological and aesthetic analyses of the animation of images continue to be developed to the present day. The idolatry/iconoclasm perspective proved to be particularly productive, not in the least because it provided much of the historical material in the book that did so much to put the animated image on the arthistorical agenda, David Freedberg's *The Power of Images*, published in 1989 and building on the author's doctoral dissertation on the Antwerp wave of iconoclasm of the late sixteenth century. In the past decade a series of major exhibitions on idolatry were organised, from the 2000–2001 exhibitions in Bern and Strasbourg on Reformation iconoclasm in the sixteenth century to the series of exhibitions under the title *Animism* (2010–2012), inspired by Bruno Latour's rethinking of idolatry and fetishism in the context of post-modernism's fascination with simulacra and facticity.¹⁸ The nexus between anthropology and aesthetics that developed in the second half of the eighteenth century played an equally determining role in how the attribution of life to art was studied, and for a long time ignored, in Western academic art history and aesthetics. As we have seen, both disciplines rejected the animation of images as a form of primitivism or the sign of an incapacity to take an aesthetic attitude towards art. Kant's advocacy of the disinter-

ested aesthetic enjoyment of the formal qualities of artworks, combined with the birth of the modern art gallery in Paris, where as a result of the Napoleonic campaigns, an unprecedented amount of religious art came on view in the Louvre, cut off from its original cultic setting, provided the foundation for the academic study of art. In the final chapter of his study on wax images, subsequently published under the title *Tote Blicke* (1910–1911), Julius von Schlosser had already shown how the formalism of German academic art history with its Kantian conceptual underpinning had made an understanding of the life and agency attributed to art almost impossible. His arguments were taken up in the 1980s and 1990s by David Freedberg, W.J.T. Mitchell and William Pietz, who all argued against the aesthetic stance and in favour of an anthropological understanding of the animation of art.¹⁹ The most radical anti-aesthetic position was defended by Alfred Gell, who in his *Art and Agency* of 1998 set out an anthropological theory of art.

Although Gell's book can be understood as a systematic consideration of the impact of art in terms of social interaction, taking its inspiration from then recent anthropological research, it displays many points of contact with classical rhetoric, both in its focus on persuasion, which is a variety of agency, and in its Aristotelian concentration on the social function and effect of art instead of its beauty or symbolic functions. Because Gell's is an anthropological theory of art, the stress is on the art nexus, the network of social relations in which artworks are embedded.²⁰ It considers them not in terms of their formal or aesthetic value, or their appreciation within the culture that produced them. Neither does it consider them as signs, visual codes to be deciphered or symbolic communications. Instead, Gell defined art objects in performative terms as systems of actions, intended to change the world rather than encode symbolic propositions about it. Artworks thus considered are the equivalents of persons, more particularly social agents. To understand why and how art objects exercise such influence on their viewers, Gell took art to be a special kind of technology. In an earlier article he had called works of art 'devices for securing the acquiescence of individuals in the network of intentionalities in which they are enmeshed'.²¹ Technology fascinates the viewer because it is the result of barely comprehensible virtuosity that exemplifies an ideal or magical efficacy people try hard to achieve in other domains.

Portrayal and the Animation of the Image

The present volume is not a collection of case studies, or a series of applications of the theoretical accounts of the lives artworks may possess outlined in the preceding section. Since these theoretical perspectives do not add up to a coherent whole, and the attributions of life to art discussed here vary enormously in context, period, art genre and public, the result would not at all be a coherent picture. Instead we have chosen to include essays that are all informed by one or more of these perspectives; rather than seeking confirmation or refutation of these theories, we have followed two strategies.

The first is to not to lose out of sight the two fundamental questions that keep returning in all explorations of the boundaries between life and art: in what sense can works of art be said to be alive, and: what makes viewers—both at the time the images in question were made, and when art historians, theologians or rhetoricians considered this problem—go beyond the easy answer, namely that in no sense works of art can be said to be living beings?

The second is to concentrate on one issue that returns in practically all cases of animated art and in most accounts: that of portrayal. The Jewish and Christian tradition of defining animated images either in terms of the living presence of Christ in the Eucharist and his images, or of condemning the adoration of images of deities from other religions as idolatry, is predicated on a conception of the relation between the living being represented and its representation that circles around notions of portrayal, in the sense that the image is the visual, recognisable representation of an individual. In fetishism, considered as a way of thinking about the attribution of life to inanimate objects, the object serves as a portrait, often in a metonymic mode, of the adored divinity. Rhetorical vivid descriptions are often portraits in words that are so successful that the public forgets it is listening to a description. Portrayal can therefore be seen as one of the dominant modes, if not the underlying paradigm of most Western ways of thinking about animated images.

Accordingly, this volume of essays offers a series of explorations of the animation of art in various ways of portrayal, in paint, stone, etching, metal or music, that all try to answer these two inescapable questions: in what sense can works of art be said to be alive and what makes viewers or historians or anthropologists go beyond the easy answer that there is no

such sense. In Part One, the portrayal of divine presences is the central issue, which in the early modern period would be transposed onto the portrayal of secular presences. The papers by Robin Osborne and Stijn Bussels deal with classical sculpture. Osborne shows how textual and visual representations of divinities differ, just as representations of the gods in mythical situations and historical situations; at the same time the relation between painted or sculpted images and the divinity is so close that differentiation between these two collapses and portrayal subsides into living presence. Bussels reconstructs a genealogy of reactions by male viewers to the *Venus de' Medici* in seventeenth-century Rome, where the statue was subjected to the kind of treatment that we now associate with pin-up girls. On the one hand, they are a continuation of classical and early Christian identifications of the statue with the goddess or the devil; but on the other, the reactions clearly belong to a literary, self-enforcing genre. The fundamental contribution by Lex Hermans sets out systematically how early modern rulers, prelates or city authorities conceived of the use of images—in stone, paint, music, coins, or books—as well as architecture to recreate their living presence in their absence. In what the British anthropologist Alfred Gell would have called cases of distributed agency, they made sure that in a culture where few people ever set eyes on their rulers, their presence was made visible through portrayal that did not necessarily have to be in the form of iconic likeness.

The essays by Minou Schraven, Lina Bolzoni, Elsje van Kessel, Iain Fenlon and Christine Göttler all in different ways illustrate how early modern artists, viewers and patrons conceived of the living image as a portrait of absent rulers or lovers, and dead ancestors or composers. Schraven explores the use of portrait medals as building deposits in Renaissance Italy. Inscribed in public memory by the rituals surrounding the moment of deposition, these medals would remain hidden from sight forever, although they were nonetheless expected to exert their agency. As Schraven shows, the new role of portrayal in this practice coincides with a radically new way of thinking about history, while at the same time it can be seen in the light of more timeless founding rituals. The contribution by Bolzoni shows that in Renaissance Italy, so-called double-sided portraits, literary devices and the enigmatic object of the 'book of the heart' together participated in a ritualistic culture aiming at presenting a complete image of a person by calling on the viewer's bodily experience. Across media, from the visual arts to the theatre, from numismatics or music or

books, the same mode of thought operated, in which images animated by the living being they represent, are conceived as varieties of portrayal. The essay by Van Kessel, then, takes this idea of portrayal as a representation of an individual as a point of departure for exploring how in the paintings covering the walls of the Venetian Doge's Palace it was gradually replaced by a model based on the lifelikeness of the image as a whole. Göttler shows how Quinten Messys' painting of the *Pietà*, that came into possession of Duke Maximilian of Bavaria (1573–1651), became imitated and followed by many artists and in various formats, thus enjoying a family and progeny almost in the sense of human family life. This afterlife went much further than the influence enjoyed by many famous paintings because of their artistic merit. In the creation of the painting's offspring artistic and religious attitudes towards making and viewing sacred art came together, which ultimately can be related to the reputation of the Sacred Face in Turin as the one genuine portrayal of Christ.

Fenlon's contribution illustrates that much of what is said about the agency of images can be made applicable to music as well. Exploring the case of Claudio Monteverdi's *Lamento d'Arianna* and the events leading up to its first performance, Fenlon shows how Monteverdi's search for a 'natural way of imitation' can be understood as that for an effective fusion of words and music, but ultimately also as a means to emotionally move the listeners. In this particular case, it becomes clear that the impact of the music was not only a matter of the composition itself but closely tied up with the history of its composer and performers.

Whereas Part One offers a series of answers all based on the model of portrayal to our first question—in what sense can images be said to be alive, Part Two explores answers to our second question—what makes viewers indeed say that images can be animated. It focuses on answers based on the Catholic doctrine of the real presence of Christ in his representations. The paper by Ralph Dekoninck explores one of the founding anecdotes for the Catholic doctrine of the real presence of Christ in his images, the vision of Saint Thomas Aquinas that an image of Christ became alive, moved and talked with the saint about his work on the Eucharist. Frédéric Cousinié explores the network of analogies, substitutions and equivalents at work in one of the most famous cases of an image come to life, Saint Bernard's vision of the lactation of a statue of the Virgin Mary. By unearthing the complex network underlying this story and its iconography he shows how one of the best-known, and within Catholicism canonic cases of an image

becoming alive, can be understood in terms of Christian theology, but can also be placed in the worldwide context of belief in fluids as intermediaries between the divine and the human. In his essay on the collection of artists' biographies by Giovanni Battista Passeri, Arno Witte retraces the transition from the Counter-Reformatory stress on vivid, lifelike art as a way of moving the faithful to a more classicist attitude that favours aesthetic distance. At the same time, his contribution illustrates how a focus on the aesthetic appreciation of art may lead to a blind spot for other, no less significant ways of thinking about its function and means.

Joris van Gastel looks more closely at the function of sculpture in this period, focusing in particular on the role of sculptures of saints and the way in which they relate to hidden relics. Making visible the hidden, these sculptures become the tangible loci of an agency that can be traced back to the remains of the holy bodies they depict. By returning to these saints a body, not only do they make them accessible, thus allowing them to take up a role in social practices, but they reshape them after their own images as they step up in the gap left by their absence. To conclude this part of the book Joanna Woodall presents another moment of transition, Lampsonius' particularly poignant attempt to create the illusion of the living presence of the dead in his gallery of engravings of Netherlandish painters. Caught in a conflict between contestations of the Catholic belief in the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the Catholic defence of the adoration of divine images, the humanist Lampsonius draws instead on the Roman tradition of family members wearing the masks, dress and insignia of those ancestors they resembled, in a performance of portrayal that brings back the dead to the present.

In Part Three we move from religious to secular contexts, to consider accounts proceeding from the rhetorical tradition of conceiving animated images as cases of intense lifelikeness or vividness. We also move from the centrality of the work of art as the locus of animation to three considerations of viewers attributing life to art. Maarten Delbeke shows how in the anecdotes about the extreme vividness of Bernini's portrait busts, rhetorical and humanist traditions continue to inform viewers' willingness to go along with the illusion that these busts are more alive than the person they portray. In the *ambiente* of seventeenth-century Rome, secular portraits can be more alive than their prototypes because viewers considered them to be visual metaphors that reveal their essence more tellingly than their actual appearance. Alina Payne tackles the most counterintui-

tive variety of art becoming alive: architecture. Foundation myths all over the world tell of human beings and animals being immured to guarantee the building's survival or uniqueness. By their very universality and persistence they call attention to a widespread belief that somehow the body and building are related, and that stone edifices possess a life and agency of their own. This issue has hardly been studied in architectural history, but living architecture became a central topic in German art history from Burckhardt to Warburg. Payne traces the presence of animated architecture in three phenomena: that of Renaissance putti, the relief and the tradition of living stone. These three aspects of architecture's life were central to Burckhardt's, Wölfflin's and Warburg's meditations on the attribution of life to art and the dangers of the viewer's loss of self they bring with them. Ultimately the defence Warburg would construct against these dangers was not Kantian aesthetic distance, but the fictionality that every representation brings with it: when man expresses his emotions in art, the act of representation creates a distance, a *Denkraum* or space to think, between his terrifying surroundings and himself.

In the last essay of this book Jason Gaiger returns to the position of the two recent authors who have put the issue of the animated work of art back on the arthistorical, aesthetic and anthropological agenda: David Freedberg and Alfred Gell. Both argue that the aesthetic approach to art, valuing works of art for their formal qualities in a museum setting, on which much nineteenth- and twentieth-century art history was predicated, has obscured from view the fact that many viewers, through the ages and across the globe, at some time and in some sense have treated images as living beings. Gaiger replaces their anti-aesthetic stance by an account of the attribution of life to images that draws on recent work on mimesis, fictionality and make-believe. His essay ties together many of the elements assembled here: the importance of portrayal as a dominant mode of the life of art, the importance of rhetorical and humanist traditions of how to create and write about vivid representation as a fiction that is so lifelike it loses its fictional character, and the awareness that it is ultimately in the interaction between the image and its viewers that animation occurs. Delbeke shows how images may be understood to act as metaphorical devices that by their very act of displacement – representing a living, coloured face in white marble for instance – reveal the living reality of what they portray. Payne shows the ambivalence and even danger of considering architecture to be alive. Gaiger demonstrates how the attribution of life to art can be

understood as one of a series of human capacities to create fictions and negotiate the boundaries between art and life.

NOTES

- 1 For collections of such behaviour towards works of art see for instance David Freedberg, *The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response* (Chicago and London, 1989); Robert Maniura and Rupert Shepherd (eds), *Presence: The Inherence of the Prototype within Images and Other Objects* (Aldershot, 2006); Horst Bredekamp, *Theorie des Bildakts: Über das Lebensrecht des Bildes* (Berlin, 2010); Brigitte Derlon and Monique Jeudy-Ballini, *La Passion de l'Art Primitif: Enquête sur les collectionneurs* (Paris, 2006) is an anthropological study of collectors treating their artworks in many respects as living persons. There is a vast literature on iconoclasm and idolatry. See for instance, in chronological order: Ernst Kitzinger, 'The Cult of Images in the Age before Iconoclasm', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 8 (1954): pp. 83–150; Oleg Grabar, *L'Iconoclisme byzantin: Le dossier archéologique* (Paris, 1984); Margaret Aston, *The English Iconoclasts* (Oxford, 1988); David Freedberg, *Iconoclasm and Painting in the Revolt of the Netherlands 1566–1609* (New York, 1988); Anthony Julius, *Idolizing Pictures: Idolatry, Iconoclasm and Jewish Art* (London, 2000); Alain Besançon, *The Forbidden Image: An Intellectual History of Iconoclasm* (Chicago and London, 2000); Cécile Dupeux (ed.), *Bildersturm: Wahnsinn oder Gottes Wille?* (Munich, 2000); Andrew McClanan (ed.), *Negating the Image: Case Studies in Iconoclasm* (Aldershot, 2005); Stacey Boldrick and Robert Clay (eds), *Iconoclasm: Contested Objects, Contested Terms* (Aldershot, 2007); Michael Cole (ed.), *The Idol in the Age of Art: Objects, Devotions and the Early Modern World* (Aldershot, 2009).
- 2 See for instance Pliny, *Natural History* 36.21; Valerius Maximus, *Memorable Doings and Sayings* 8.11.14, Lucian (attr.), *Erotes* 13–17; and the essays by Osborne and Bussels in this volume.
- 3 John Barrell, "'The Dangerous Goddess': Masculinity, Prestige, and the Aesthetic in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain', *Cultural Critique* 12 (1989): pp. 101–131 and John R. Hale, 'Art and Audience: The *Medici Venus* c. 1750–c. 1850', *Italian Studies* 31 (1976): pp. 37–58.
- 4 Elsje van Kessel, 'Staging Bianca Capello: Painting and Theatricality in Sixteenth-Century Venice', *Art History* 33/2 (2010): pp. 278–291.
- 5 Denis Diderot, *Pensées détachées sur la peinture* (Paris, 1994), p. 769: 'J'ai vu une fois une clef de montre imprimée sur la cuisse d'un plâtre voluptueux'; see also *Pensées détachées*, pp. 767 and 769–770; the *Salon* of 1767 (Oxford, 1964–68), pp. 471–472; 519; 530–533; and 562–578, a very layered meditation on living presence, viewer involvement and theatricality occasioned by one of Vernet's seascapes. On the latter see Bram van Oostveldt, 'Ut pictura hortus/ ut theatrum hortus: Theatricality and French picturesque garden theory', *Art History* 33/2 (2010): pp. 364–378.
- 6 Giovanni Andrea Borboni, *Delle Statue* (Rome, 1661), p. 84.
- 7 Lex Hermans, 'The Performing Venue: The Visual Play of Italian Courtly Theaters in the Sixteenth Century', *Art History* 33 (2010): pp. 292–303.
- 8 Stephen Bann, *The True Vine: On Visual Representation and the Western Tradition* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 105–201; Kenneth Gross, *The Dream of the Moving Statue* (Ithaca and

- London, 1992); Victor I. Stoichita, *The Pygmalion-Effect: From Ovid to Hitchcock* (Chicago, 2008); Marjorie B. Garber and Nancy J. Vickers (eds), *The Medusa Reader* (New York and London, 2003).
- 9 William Pietz, 'Fetish', in: Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff (eds), *Critical Terms for Art History* (Chicago and London, 2003), pp. 307–308.
 - 10 Aristotle, *Poetics* 1455a, Cicero, *Orator* xxxix. 134; Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria* vi. ii. 32 and xii. xiii. 9–11.
 - 11 On the wider context of verbal and visual rhetoric see Paul Zanker, 'Enargeia in Ancient Criticism of Poetry', *Rheinisches Museum* 124 (1981): pp. 207–311; on vividness as an issue in visual persuasion see Caroline A. van Eck, *Classical Rhetoric and the Visual Arts in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge and New York, 2007), Chapter III and v; for Renaissance developments see Mary Hazard, 'The Anatomy of "Liveliness" as a Concept in Renaissance Aesthetics', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 33 (1975): pp. 407–418; for the Renaissance transference of rhetorical concepts of vivid representation into the discourse of the visual arts see Martin Kemp, 'From "Mimesis" to "Phantasia": The *Quattrocento* Vocabulary of Creation, Inspiration and Genius in the Visual Arts', *Viator* 8 (1977): pp. 347–398; for the sixteenth century see Valeska von Rosen, 'Die Enargeia des Gemäldes: Zu einem vergessenen Inhalt des Ut-pictura-poesis und seiner Relevanz für das cinquecenteske Bildkonzept', *Marburger Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenschaft* 27 (2000): pp. 171–208.
 - 12 Hans Belting's *Bild und Kult: Eine Geschichte des Bildes vor dem Zeitalter der Kunst* (Munich, 1990; English translation *Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image before the Era of Art*, Chicago and London, 1994) is a survey of Christian thought on the religious image as divine presence and the viewing attitudes fostered by Eucharistic theology.
 - 13 On the history of fetishism and its entanglement with aesthetics see William Pietz, 'The Problem of the Fetish, I', *Res* 9 (1985): pp. 5–17; 'The Problem of the Fetish, IIIa', *Res* 16 (1988): pp. 121–122 and 'Fetish', pp. 307–308; Hartmut Böhme, *Fetischismus und Kultur: Eine andere Theorie der Moderne* (Hamburg, 2006); Hartmut Böhme and Johannes Endres (eds), *Der Code der Leidenschaften: Fetischismus in den Künsten* (Munich, 2010), in particular the essay by Frank Fehrenbach; and Caroline A. van Eck, *François Lemée et la statue de Louis XIV sur la place des Victoires: Les origines des théories ethnologiques du fétichisme* (Paris, 2013).
 - 14 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Berlin, 1790), 1–5. See also pp. B 159 and 124–125.
 - 15 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Italienische Reise* (Hamburg, 1967 [1950¹]), vol. 11, pp. 158–159, entry for 13 January 1787. See also Goethe's *Briefe*, Part IV (Weimar, 1887–1896), vol. 8, pp. 130–131. On the reception of this statue from the Renaissance onwards see Frances Haskell and Nicholas Penny, *Taste and the Antique* (New Haven and London, 1982), pp. 269–271.
 - 16 Johann Gottfried Herder, 'Tagebuch', in *Italienische Reise: Briefe und Tagebuchaufzeichnungen, 1788–1789* (Munich, 1988), pp. 602–603.
 - 17 Jacques-Antoine Dulaure, *Des cultes qui ont précédé et amené l'idolâtrie ou l'adoration des figures humaines* (Paris, 1805), p. 20: 'All things, and even all words, spoken or written, to which one attributes a miraculous force foreign to their essence and contrary to the laws of nature, must belong to fetishism'; Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *The Friend*, ed. Barbara E. Rooke (London and Princeton, 1969), vol. 1, p. 106: 'Could we emancipate ourselves from

the bedimmed influences of custom, and the transforming witchcraft of early association, we should see as numerous tribes of Fetish Worshipers in our streets of London and Paris, as we have on the coasts of Africa.'

- 18 *Bildersturm: Wahnsinn oder Gottes Wille*, Historisches Museum Bern (2 November 2000–16 April 2001), Musée de l'Oeuvre Notre-Dame, Strassburg (12 May–26 August 2001); *Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion, and Art*, ZKM Karlsruhe (4 May–4 August 2002); *Animism / Animismus*, Extra City, Kunsthal Antwerpen, Museum of Contemporary Art Antwerp (22 January–2 May 2010), Kunsthalle Bern (15 May–18 July 2010), Generali Foundation, Vienna (16 September 2011–29 January 2012), Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin and Freie Universität Berlin (16 March–6 May 2012).
- 19 Julius von Schlosser, 'Geschichte der Porträtbildnerei in Wachs', *Jahrbuch der kunsthistorischen Sammlungen des allerhöchsten Kaiserhauses* 29/3 (1910–1911): pp. 171–258, modern edition published under the title *Tote Blicke* (Berlin, 1993); W.J.T. Mitchell, *What do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images* (Chicago and London, 2005), p. 180; Annabel Wharton, 'Icon, Idol, Totem and Fetish', in Anthony Eastmond and Liz James (eds), *Icon and Word: The Power of Images in Byzantium: Studies presented to Robin Cormack* (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 3–13; Freedberg, *The Power of Images*, p. 436.
- 20 Alfred Gell, *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 6–7.
- 21 Alfred Gell, 'The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology', in Jeremy Coote and Anthony Shelton (eds), *Anthropology and Aesthetics* (Oxford 1992), p. 43; see also Cicero *De oratore* I.202, II.35 and II.337; *Brutus* II.7–8 for the similarities between the views on persuasion and agency between classical rhetoric and Gell.